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Abstract
A decision maker is asked to express her beliefs by assigning proba-
bilities to certain possible states. We focus on the relationship between
her database and her beliefs. We show that, if beliefs given a union
of two databases are a convex combination of beliefs given each of
the databases, the belief formation process follows a simple formula:
beliefs are a similarity-weighted average of the beliefs induced by each
past case.
1 Introduction
A physician administers a certain treatment to her patient. She is asked to
describe her prognosis by assigning probabilities to each of several possible
outcomes ­ = f1;:::;ng of the treatment. The physician has a lot of data
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1on past outcomes of the treatment, and she can readily quote the empirical
frequencies of these outcomes. Yet, patients are not identical. They di®er
in age, gender, heart condition, and several other measurable variables that
may a®ect the treatment outcome. Let us assume that these form a vector
of real-valued variables X = (X1;:::;Xk) and that X was measured for all
past cases. Thus, case j is a (k + 1)-tuple (xj;!j) 2 Rk £ ­ where, xj 2 Rk
is the value of X observed in case j, and !j 2 ­ is the observed outcome of
the treatment in case j. The new patient is de¯ned by the values xt 2 Rk of
X. How should these measurements a®ect the probability assessment of the
physician?
It makes sense to restrict attention to those past cases that had the same
X values as the one at hand, and compute relative frequencies only for these
data. That is, to estimate the probability of state ! by its relative frequency
in the sub-database consisting of all cases j for which xj = xt. However,
large as the original database may be, the sub-database of patients whose X
value is identical to xt might be quite small or even empty. Therefore, we
wish to have a procedure for assessments of probabilities over ­ that makes
use of data with di®erent X values, while taking di®erences in these values
into account.
Assume that the physician can judge which past cases are more similar
to the one at hand, and which are less similar. In evaluating the probability
of a state, she may assign a higher weight to more similar cases. Formally,
suppose that there exists a function s : Rk £ Rk ! R++, where s(xt;xj)
measures the degree to which, in the physician's judgment, a patient whose
presenting conditions are given by xt 2 Rk is similar to another patient whose
presenting conditions are xj 2 Rk. Given a database of past cases ((xj;!j))j,
we suggest to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of treatment for








2where pj 2 ¢n¡1 is the unit vector assigning probability 1 to !j.
Observe that (unquali¯ed) empirical frequencies (of states in ­) consti-
tute a special case of this formula, where the function s is constant. Another
special case is given by s(xt;xj) = 1fxt=xjg.1 In this case, (1) boils down to
the empirical frequencies (of states in ­) in the sub-database de¯ned by xt.
Thus, formula (1) may be viewed as o®ering a continuous spectrum between
the unconditional empirical frequencies and conditional empirical frequencies
given xt.
In this paper we study the probability assignment problem axiomati-
cally. We consider the relationship between various databases, modeled as
sequences of cases, and the probabilities they induce. We impose two axioms
on the probability assignment function. The ¯rst, invariance, states that the
order of cases in the database is immaterial. This axiom is not very restrictive
if the description of a case is informative enough, including, for instance, the
time of occurrence of the case. The second axiom, concatenation, requires
that, for every two databases, the probability induced by their concatenation
is a convex combination of the probabilities induced by each of them sepa-
rately. In behavioral terms, this axiom states that, if each of two databases
induces a preference for one act over another, then the same preference will
be induced by their concatenation. Under a minor additional condition, these
two axioms are equivalent to the existence of a similarity function such that
the assignment of probabilities is done as a similarity-weighted average of
the probabilities induced by single cases. Two additional assumptions then
yield the representation (1).
In our theorem, the function s is derived from presumably observable
probability assignments given various possible databases. We interpret this
function as a similarity function. Yet, it need not satisfy any particular
1We assumed that the function s is strictly positive. This simpli¯es the analysis as one
need not deal with vanishing denomintaors. Yet, for the purposes of the present discussion
it is useful to consider the more general case, allowing zero similarity values. This case is
not axiomatized in this paper.
3properties, and may not even be symmetric. One may impose additional
conditions, as in Billot, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (2004), under which there
exists a norm n on Rk such that
s(xt;xj) = e
¡n(xt¡xj): (2)
Such a function s satis¯es symmetry and multiplicative transitivity (that is,
s(x;z) ¸ s(x;y)s(y;z) for all x;y;z).2
The Bayesian approach calls for the assignment of a prior probability
measure to a state space, and for the updating of this prior by Bayes's law
given new information. Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937), Savage (1954), and
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) provided compelling axiomatizations that
justify the Bayesian approach from a normative viewpoint. But these axiom-
atizations do not help a predictor to form a prior if she is does not already
have one. In this context, our approach can be viewed as providing a belief-
generation tool that may be an aid to a predictor who wishes to develop a
Bayesian prior.
Such a predictor may be convinced by our axiomatization that, in certain
situations, it might be desirable to generate beliefs according to formula (1).
Yet, just as Bayesian axiomatizations do not serve to choose a prior, our
axiomatization does not provide help in choosing the similarity function.
Even if one adopts a certain functional form as in (2), the question still
remains, which speci¯c similarity function should we choose?
We believe that this question is, in the ¯nal analysis, an empirical one.
Hence, the similarity function should be estimated from past data. Gilboa,
Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2004) axiomatize formula (1) for the case n = 2
(not dealt with in this paper), and develop the statistical theory required
for the estimation of the function s, assuming that such a function governs
2Billot, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (2004) deal with a similarity-weighted average for a
single real-valued variable, assuming that values of the same variables were observed in
the past. Their axioms may be applied to any single component of the probability vector
discussed here.
4the data generating process. The present paper provides an axiomatization
for the case n > 2. In certain situations, it allows to reduce the question
of belief formation to the problem of similarity assessment. Developing the
corresponding statistical theory is beyond the scope of this paper.
2 Model and Result
Let ­ = f1;:::;ng be a set of states of nature, n ¸ 3.3 Let C be a non-empty
set of cases. C may be an abstract set of arbitrarily large cardinality. A
database is a sequence of cases, D 2 Cr for r ¸ 1. The set of all databases is
denoted C¤ = [r¸1Cr. The concatenation of two databases, D = (c1;:::;cr) 2
Cr and E = (c0
1;:::;c0




Observe that the same element of C may appear more than once in a given
database. This structure implicitly assumes that additional observations
of the same case do in fact add information. Indeed, when one estimates
probabilities by relative frequencies, one subscribes to the same assumption.
For the statement of our main result we need not assume that C and ­
are a-priori related. We therefore impose no structure on C, simplifying no-
tation and obtaining a more general result. Yet, the intended interpretation
is as in the Introduction, namely, that C is a subset of Rk £ ­. The predic-
tion problem at hand, described above by xt 2 Rk, is ¯xed throughout this
discussion. We therefore suppress it from the notation when no confusion is
likely to arise.
For each D 2 C¤, the predictor has a probabilistic belief p(D) 2 ¢(­)
about the realization of ! 2 ­ in the problem under discussion.
For r ¸ 1, let ¦r be the set of all permutations on f1;:::;rg, i.e., all
3Our result only holds when the range of the probability assignment function is not
contained in a line segment. The condition n ¸ 3 is obviously a necessary but insu±cient
condition for this requirement to hold. We mention it here in order to highlight the fact
that the case n = 2 is not covered by our result. See Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler
(2004).
5bijections ¼ : f1;:::;rg ! f1;:::;rg. For D 2 Cr and a permutation ¼ 2 ¦r,
let ¼D be the permuted database, that is, ¼D 2 Cr is de¯ned by (¼D)i =
D¼(i) for i · r.
We formulate the following axioms.
Invariance: For every r ¸ 1, every D 2 Cr, and every permutation
¼ 2 ¦r, p(D) = p(¼D).
Concatenation: For every D;E 2 C¤, p(D±E) = ¸p(D)+(1¡¸)p(E) for
some ¸ 2 (0;1).
The Invariance axiom might appear rather restrictive, as it does not allow
cases that appear later in D to have a greater impact on probability assess-
ments than do cases that appear earlier. But this does not mean that cases
that are chronologically more recent cannot have a greater weight than less
recent ones. Indeed, should one include time as one of the variables in X,
all permutations of a sequence of cases would contain the same information.
In general, cases that are not judged to be exchangeable di®er in values of
some variables. Once these variables are brought forth, the Invariance axiom
seems quite plausible.
The Concatenation axiom states that the beliefs induced by the concate-
nation of two databases cannot lie outside the interval connecting the beliefs
induced by each database separately. If an expected payo® maximizer is
faced with a decision problem where the states of nature are ­, the Concate-
nation axiom could be re-stated as follows: for every two acts a and b, if a is
(weakly) preferred to b given database D as well as given database E, then
a is (weakly) preferred to b given the database D±E, and a strict preference
given one of fD;Eg su±ces for a strict preference given D ± E.
We can now state our main result.
Theorem 1 Let there be given a function p : C¤ ! ¢(­). The following
are equivalent:
(i) p satis¯es the Invariance axiom, the Combination axiom, and not all
6fp(D)gD2C¤ are collinear;
(ii) There exists a function ^ p : C ! ¢(­), where not all f^ p(c)gc2C are
collinear, and a function s : C ! R++ such that, for every r ¸ 1 and every







Moreover, in this case the function ^ p is unique, and the function s is
unique up to multiplication by a positive number.
This theorem may be extended to a general measurable state space ­
with no additional complications, because for every D only a ¯nite number
of measures are involved in the formula for p(D).
Theorem 1 deals with an abstract set of cases C. Let us now assume,
as in the Introduction, that a case cj is a (k + 1)-tuple (xj;!j) 2 Rk £ ­,
and that the function p is de¯ned for every database D, and a given point
xt 2 Rk. The theorem then states that, under the non-collinearity condition,
a function p(D) = p(xt;D) on C¤ satis¯es the Invariance and Concatenation
axioms if and only if there are functions s(cj) = s(xt;cj) and ^ p(cj) = ^ p(xt;cj)
on C such that (¤) holds for p(D) = p(xt;D).
This application of formula (¤) is more general than formula (1) in two
ways: ¯rst, ^ p(xt;cj) need not equal pj, namely, the unit vector assigning
probability 1 to state !j. Second, s(xt;cj) may depend on !j and not only on
(xt;xj). To obtain the representation (1), one therefore needs two additional
assumptions. First, assume that a state ! that has never been observed in
the database is assigned probability zero. This guarantees that ^ p(xt;cj) =
pj. Second, assume that if the names of the states of nature are permuted
in the entire database, then the resulting probability vector is accordingly
permuted. This would guarantee the independence of s(xt;cj) of !j.
Limitations
Formula (1) might be unreasonable when the entire database is very small.
Speci¯cally, if there is only one observation, resulting in state !i, pt assigns
7probability 1 to !i for any xt. This appears to be quite extreme. However, for
large databases it may be acceptable to assign zero probability to a state that
has never been observed. Moreover, a state that has never been observed may
not be conceived of to begin with. That is, for many applications it seems
natural to de¯ne ­ as the set of states that have been observed in the past.
In this case, (1) assigns a positive probability to each state.
The intended application of formula (1) is for the assignment of prob-
abilities given databases that are large, but that are not large enough to
condition on every possible combination of values of (X1;:::;Xk). Indeed,
one may assume that the function p is de¯ned only on a restricted domain of
large databases, such as C¤
L = [n¸LCn for a large L ¸ 1. It is straightforward
to extend our result to such restricted domains.
The Concatenation axiom that we use in this paper is very similar in spirit
to the Combination axiom used in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003). Much of
the discussion of this axiom in that paper applies here as well. In particular,
there are two important classes of examples wherein the Concatenation axiom
does not seem plausible. The ¯rst includes situations where the similarity
function is learnt from the data.4 The second class of examples involves
both inductive and deductive reasoning. For instance, if we try to learn the
parameter of a coin, and then use this estimate to make predictions over
several future tosses, the Concatenation axiom is likely to fail.
3 Appendix: Proof
It is obvious that (ii) implies the Invariance axiom. Hence we may restrict
attention to functions p that satisfy the Invariance axiom, and show that for
such functions, (ii) is equivalent to the Concatenation axiom combined with
4The estimation procedure in Gilboa, Liebermen, and Schmeidler (2004) estimates the
similarity function from the data, but assumes that these data were generated according to
a ¯xed (though unknown) similarity function. However, when the data generating process
itself involves an evolving similarity function, our formulae and estimation procedures are
no longer valid.
8the condition that not all fp(D)gD2C¤ are collinear.
In light of the Invariance axiom, a database D 2 C¤ can be identi¯ed
with a counter vector ID : C ! Z+, where ID(c) is the number of times that
c appears in D. Formally, for D = (c1;:::;cr) let ID(c) = #fi · rjci = cg.
The set of counter vectors obtained from all databases D 2 C¤ is I = fI :
C ! Z+ j0 <
P
j2C I(j) < 1g. For I 2 I, de¯ne p(I) = p(D) for a D 2 C¤
such that I = ID. It is straightforward that for each I 2 I such a D exists,
and that, due to the Invariance axiom, p(D) is well-de¯ned.
We now turn to state a version of our theorem for the counter vector set-
up. Observe that the concatenation of two databases D and E corresponds
to the pointwise addition of their counter vectors. Formally, ID±E = ID +IE.
The Concatenation axioms is therefore re-stated as the following.
Combination: For every I;J 2 I, p(I + J) = ¸p(I) + (1 ¡ ¸)p(J) for
some ¸ 2 (0;1).
Theorem 2 Let there be given a function p : I ! ¢(­). The following are
equivalent:
(i) p satis¯es the Combination axiom, and not all fp(I)gI2I are collinear;
(ii) There are probability vectors fpjgj2C ½ ¢(­), not all collinear, and







Moreover, in this case the probabilities fpjgj2C are unique, and the weights
fsjgj2C are unique up to multiplication by a positive number.
Observe that Theorems 1 and 2 are equivalent. We now turn to prove
Theorem 2. It is straightforward to see that (ii) implies (i). Similarly, the
uniqueness part of the theorem is easily veri¯ed. We therefore only prove
that (i) implies (ii).
We start with the case of a ¯nite C, say, C = f1;:::;mg.
9Remark: For every I 2 I, k ¸ 1, p(kI) = p(I).
Proof: Using the fact that p(I + J) 2 [p(I);p(J)] inductively.5¤
This Remark allows an extension of the domain of p to rational-coordinate
vectors. Speci¯cally, given I 2 QC
+; choose k such that kI 2 ZC
+, and de¯ne
p(I) as identical to p(kI). The Remark guarantees that the selection of k
is immaterial. It follows that one may restrict attention to p(I) only for
I 2 QC
+ \ ¢(C), that is, for rational points in the simplex of the case types.
Restricted to this domain, p is a mapping from QC
+ \ ¢(C) into ¢(­). We
now state an auxiliary result that will complete the proof of (ii).6
Proposition 3 Assume that p : Qm
+ \ ¢m¡1 ! ¢n¡1 satis¯es the following
conditions: (i) for every q;q0 2 Qm
+ \ ¢m¡1, and every rational ® 2 (0;1),
p(®q + (1 ¡ ®)q0) = ¸p(q) + (1 ¡ ¸)p(q0) for some ¸ 2 (0;1); and (ii) not all
fp(q)gq2Qm
+\¢m¡1 are collinear. Then there are probability vectors fpjgj·m ½
¢n¡1, not all of which are collinear, and positive numbers fsjgj·m such that,








For j · m, let qj denote the j-unit vector in Rm, i.e., the j-th extreme
point of ¢m¡1. Obviously, one has to de¯ne pj = p(qj). Observe that,
since p(®q + (1 ¡ ®)q0) is a convex combination of p(q) and p(q0), not all
fp(qj) = pjgj·m are collinear.
We have to show that there are positive numbers fsjgj·m such that (²)
holds for every q 2 Qm
+ \ ¢m¡1.
Step 1: m = 3.
5Throughout this paper, the interval de¯ned by two vectors, p and q, is given by
[p;q] = f¸p + (1 ¡ ¸)q j¸ 2 [0;1]g:
6The following proposition is a manifestation of a general principle, stating that func-
tions that map intervals onto intervals are projective mappings. Another manifestation of
this principle in decision theory can be found in Chew (1983).
10Let q¤ = 1
3(q1 + q2 + q3). Choose positive numbers s1;s2;s3 such that
(²) holds for q¤. Observe that such s1;s2;s3 exist and are unique up to




j·m sjqj for all q 2
Q3
+ \ ¢2. Denote E = fq 2 Q3
+ \ ¢2 jps(q) = p(q)g. We know that
fq1;q2;q3;q¤g ½ E, and we wish to show that E = Q3
+ \ ¢2.
Step 1.1: Simplicial points are in E:
The ¯rst simplicial partition of Q3
+ \ ¢2 is a partition to four triangles







The second simplicial partition is obtained by similarly partitioning each of
the four triangles to four smaller triangles, and the k-th simplicial partition
is de¯ned recursively. The simplicial points of the k-th simplicial partition
are all the vertices of triangles of this partition.
We now state the following
Claim: If the vertices and the center of gravity of a simplicial triangle are




Insert Figure 1 Here
||||||||||||-
If four points that are not collinear, a;b;c;d, are in E, then the point
de¯ned by the intersection of the segments [a;b] and [c;d] is also in E. The





kg be the vertices of a triangle in the k-th simplicial
























k) is the intersection





k), and the line connecting q1
k and
q2








k) have to be the intersection of















k). Since not all p(q)




k) 2 E. Similarly,






















k)g, the center of gravity is
equal to that of convfq1
k;q2
k;q3
kg, which is already known to be in E. Next
consider the center of gravity of one of the three sub-triangles that have a
vertex is common with convfq1
k;q2
k;q3
kg. Assume, without loss of generality,



















































































k is in E. The center of






















k)]. Hence the center of gravity









k)g is in E.¤
Applying the claim inductively, we conclude that E contains all points





Observe that, if q 2 Q3
+\conv(q;q0;q00), then p(q) 2 conv(p(q);p(q0);p(q00)).




kg, such that q 2 convfq1
k;q2
k;q3
kg and that limk!1 q
j
k = q
for all j = 1;2;3. Since ps is a continuous function, limk!1 ps(q
j
k) = ps(q) for
all j = 1;2;3. Moreover, because both p and ps satisfy the Combination ax-







k)g. This is possible only if p(q) = ps(q). Hence q 2 E. Since the choice
of q was arbitrary, E = Q3
+ \ ¢2.
Step 2: m > 3.
12Step 2.1: De¯ning sj:
Consider a triple j;k;l · m such that fpj;pk;plg are not collinear. Apply










for all q 2 Qm
+\conv(fqj;qk;qlg). Moreover, for all º 2 fj;k;lg, pº(fj;k;lg) =
p(qº) = pº, and the coe±cients fs
fj;k;lg
º gº2fj;k;lg are unique up to multiplica-
tion by a positive number.
Next consider all triples j;k;l · m such that fpj;pk;plg are not collinear.




k is independent of l. To see this,
assume that l and l0 are such that neither fpj;pk;plg nor fpj;pk;pl0g are









k . Denote this ratio by °jk. Ob-
serve that it is de¯ned for every distinct j;k · m, because for every j;k there
exists at least one l such that fpj;pk;plg are not collinear. Further, note that
if fpj;pk;plg are not collinear, then °jk°kl°lj = 1.
De¯ne s1 = 1 and sj = °j1 for 1 < j · m. We wish to show that, for every
triple j;k;l · m such that fpj;pk;plg are not collinear, fs
fj;k;lg
º gº2fj;k;lg is





k = sj=sk, or that °jk = sj=sk. If fp1;pj;pkg are not collinear,
then this equation follows from °1j°jk°k1 = 1. If, however, fp1;pj;pkg are
collinear, then fp1;pj;plg and fp1;pk;plg are not collinear. Hence °kl = sk=sl
and °lj = sl=sj. In this case, °jk = 1=°kl°lj = sj=sk.




j·m sjqj . Thus, we wish to show
that p(q) = ps(q) for all q 2 Qm
+ \ ¢m¡1.
Step 2.2: Completion:
We prove the following claim by induction on k, 3 · k · m:
Claim: For every subset K ½ f1;:::;mg with jKj = k, if fpjgj2K are not
collinear, then p(q) = ps(q) holds for every q 2 ¢K ´ Qm
+ \ conv(fqj jj 2
K g).
13Proof: The case k = 3 was proven in Step 1. We assume that the
claim is correct for k ¸ 3, and we prove it for k + 1. Let there be given
K ½ f1;:::;mg with jK j = k + 1, such that fpjgj2K are not collinear. Let
J = fj 2 K jfplgl2Knfjg are not collinearg. Observe that, for every j 2 J,
p(q) = ps(q) holds for every q 2 ¢Knfjg.
We argue that jJ j ¸ k. To see this, assume that there were two distinct
elements j and k, in KnJ. Then all fplgl6=j are collinear, as are all fplgl6=k.
Since jK j = k + 1 ¸ 4, there are at least two distinct elements in Knfj;kg.
Both pj and pk are collinear with fplgl6=j;k, and it follows that all fplgl2K are
collinear, a contradiction.
Consider a rational point q 2 Qm
+ in the relative interior of conv(fql jl 2
K g). Denote q =
P
l2K ®lql with ®l > 0. For every j 2 J, Let q(j) be the





1¡®jql. Obviously, ps(qj) = p(qj) = pj. Moreover, since
j 2 J, one may apply the claim to Knfjg, yielding ps(q(j)) = p(q(j)). Since
ps satis¯es the Combination axiom, it follows that both p(q) and ps(q) are
on the interval [ps(qj);ps(q(j))] = [pj;p(q(j))].
Next we wish to show that, for at least two elements j;k 2 J, the intervals
[pj;p(q(j))] and [pk;p(q(k))] cannot lie on the same line. Assume not, that
is, that all intervals f[pj;p(q(j))]gj2J lie on a line L. If J = K, this implies
that all fpjgj2K are collinear, a contradiction. Assume, then, that there is
an i such that J = Knfig. In this case, pi is not on L. For j 2 J, consider
q(j) as a convex combination of qi and a point q0 2 conv(fqljl 2 Knfi;jgg.
By the Combination axiom, p(q0) is on the line L. Moreover, since pi 6= p(q0),
p(q(j)) is in the open interval (pi;p(q0)), and therefore not on L. But this
contradicts the assumption that all intervals f[pj;p(q(j))]gj2J lie on L.
It follows that there are distinct j;k 2 J for which the intervals [pj;p(q(j))]
and [pk;p(q(k))] do not lie on the same line. Hence these intervals can inter-
sect in at most one point. Since both p(q) and ps(q) are on both intervals,
p(q) = ps(q) follows.
14We conclude that p(q) = ps(q) holds for every rational q in the rela-
tive interior of conv(fqj jj 2 K g), as well as for all rational points in
conv(fql jl 2 K nfjgg) for j 2 J. It is left to show that p(q) = ps(q)
for rational points in conv(fql jl 2 K nfigg) for i 2 KnJ. Assume not.
Then, for some q 2 Qm
+ \ conv(fql jl 2 K nfigg); p(q) 6= ps(q). But p(qi) =
ps(qi) = pi. Hence the interval (qi;q) is mapped by p into (pi;p(q)) and by
ps { into (pi;ps(q)). Note that these two open intervals are disjoint. But for
any q0 2 (qi;q) we should have p(q0) = ps(q0), a contradiction. ¤
It is left to complete the proof of the su±ciency of the Combination axiom
in case C is in¯nite. For every B ½ C, let IB be the set of databases I 2 I
such that
P
j= 2B I(j) = 0. For every j 2 C, de¯ne pj by p(Ij) where Ij is
de¯ned by Ij(j) = 1 and Ij(k) = 0 for k 6= j. For every ¯nite B ½ C, for
which not all fpjgj2B are collinear, there is a function sB such that (¤) holds
for every I 2 IB. Moreover, this function is unique up to multiplication by
a positive number. Fix one such ¯nite set C0 and choose a function sC0. For
every other ¯nite B ½ C, for which not all fpjgj2B are collinear, consider
B0 = C0 [ B. Over B0 there exists a unique sB0 that satis¯es (¤) for all
I 2 IB0 and that extends sC0. De¯ne sB as the restriction of sB0 to B. To
see that this construction is well-de¯ned, suppose that B1 and B2 are two
such sets with a non-empty intersection. Consider B = B1 [ B2. Since sB1
and sB2 are both restrictions of sB, they are equal on B1 \ B2. ¤¤
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The point m1 is the intersection of the lines q2q3 and q1c. The points m2 and
m3 are similarly constructed. The point n3 is the intersection on m1m2 and
q3c. The point n1 is similarly constructed. The point o2 is the intersection of
n1n3 and q2q3. Finally, the center of gravity of m1m2q3 is the intersection of
m2o2 and q3m3 at c0.
Figure 1: The vertices and center of gravity of four sub-triangles
174 Appendix for Referees: Compatibility with
Bayesianism
Whether our approach is compatible with Bayesianism depends on the exact
de¯nition of the state space. In our problem, there are at least three levels at
which the Bayesian approach may be applied. The ¯rst, which is minimal in
terms of its information requirements, is to suggest that the physician have
a prior probability measure on the product space, £ ´ Rk £ ­, describing
the joint distribution of all the variables (X1;:::;Xk) as well as the possible
outcomes, ­. If such a prior exists, all that the physician needs to do is to
update this prior, given the values of (X1;:::;Xk), and obtain a posterior on
­.
Our similarity-weighted relative frequencies can be viewed as a step to-
wards the generation of a prior over £. Speci¯cally, formula (1) suggests a
method for the generation of beliefs over ­ given every possible combination
of values for (X1;:::;Xk). If these posteriors are coupled with some marginal
over (X1;:::;Xk), a prior over £ will result. For prediction of the state ! 2 ­
given (X1;:::;Xk), a complete prior is not necessary. Yet, our approach is
consistent with the Bayesian approach, as applied to £, and may be viewed
as complementary to it.
At the other extreme, one may apply the Bayesian approach to a much
more informative state space, allowing all conceivable observations without
imposing any additional structure on the problem. This would mean that
the physician has a prior distribution over all the sequences of observations
she may obtain. Thus, the state space is ª = [t¸1£t, and for every t
the prior induces a well-de¯ned marginal distribution on £t. This marginal
distribution can be updated given (t ¡ 1) past observations, as well as the
t-th realization of (X1;:::;Xk), and the posterior on !t can be computed.
This application of the Bayesian approach would result in beliefs over
­ generated by Bayes's updating. It is not clear, however, how one should
18generate a prior belief over the much larger state space ª = [t¸1£t. Past
observations can hardly provide the required information, since such obser-
vations are already included in the ª, whereas the prior should re°ect the
beliefs one has before obtaining these observations. At any rate, our approach
in consistent with the Bayesian approach when applied to the space ª. In-
deed, the only constraint imposed by the Bayesian approach at this level
is the following "sure-thing principle": the posterior on ­ given a sequence
of observations of length t is a weighted average of the posteriors given all
possible continuations of the sequence of length (t+1). (See Green and Park
(1996).) It is readily observed that our formula satis¯es this constraint.
The standard application of the Bayesian approach in statistics is at an
intermediate level: it assumes that the observations are drawn from £ in
an i.i.d. manner, but that the probability law of this process is not known.
Rather, there exists a prior over a certain set of possible probability laws.
This prior induces a probability over all ª, but it imposes additional structure
on the problem.
The prior of the probability law governing the data generating process
should be derived from some theory, or past instances of similar statistical
problems. However, if one uses Bayesian update at the level of the probabil-
ity laws, and then deduces beliefs over ­ from it, one will typically not satisfy
the Concatenation axiom.7 Hence our formula is inconsistent with this appli-
cation of the Bayesian approach. Indeed, this inconsistency is apparent even
if all observations in the database share their x values. In this case, our for-
mula reduces to estimating probabilities over ­ by relative frequencies, and
this method of estimation is, in general, inconsistent with Bayesian inference
about the underlying probability law.8
Our formula proposes a method for assigning probabilities, which is an
7See the Limitation sub-section below.
8To see this, one may consider replication of the database. Such a replication does not
change the relative frequencies, but it induces a higher posterior on the probability laws
that maximize the likelihood function.
19extension of simple relative frequencies. It is designed to deal with databases
that are not homogenous, that is, that di®er in their x values. But it does not
attempt to deal with situations in which one can conceive of all the possible
probability laws, and feel con¯dent enough to have a prior over them.
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